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Abstract 
 
This article investigates the process of task conceptualization, through which 
participants turn the instructions on a task into a mental representation of that task. 
We provide the first empirical evidence that this process of conceptualization can 
directly influence the inhibitory demands of a task. Data from Experiments 1 and 2 
(both n=24) suggested that robust difficulties on inhibitory tasks can be overcome if 
preschoolers conceptualize the tasks in a way that avoids the need for inhibitory 
control. Experiment 3 (n=60) demonstrated that even when all other aspects of a task 
are identical, simply changing how the rules are introduced can influence whether 
such a conceptualization is adopted – thereby influencing children’s performance on 
the task.  An appreciation of the process of conceptualization is essential for our 
understanding of how inhibitory control and knowledge interact in early development. 
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Introduction 
Inhibitory control is the cognitive process used to prevent the execution of 
behavior that is incompatible with current task goals (Chevalier et al., 2012). 
Prepotent responses can be incompatible with task goals, because they are triggered 
without recourse to them (e.g., Isoda & Hikosaka, 2011; Norman & Shallice, 1986; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Whether a task contains a goal-inappropriate prepotent 
response will depend, among other things, on the way that participants conceptualize 
the task. In other words, it will depend on the contents of the mental representation 
that participants construct in order to perform the task. The presence of a goal-
inappropriate prepotent response will have a significant effect on the performance of 
young children in particular, because of their weak inhibitory control.   
Vygotsky (1962) was the first to propose that the way children represent a task 
will determine their subsequent performance on it. Indeed, conceptual understanding 
more broadly may be seen as central to early cognitive development (e.g., Zelazo, 
Frye & Rapus, 1996; Kirkham, Cruess & Diamond, 2002). Specifically in relation to 
inhibitory task performance, several theorists have suggested that “task 
conceptualization” affects inhibitory demands (e.g., Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Kloo, 
Perner & Giritzer, 2010; Russell, 1996; Simpson & Riggs, 2005a). However, to our 
knowledge, there have been no attempts to put this idea to the test. The aim of this 
article, therefore, is to empirically investigate how this conceptualization process 
affects inhibitory demands. 
We start with the assertion that prepotent responses are not the product of the 
world; they are the product of the mind. How an individual conceptualizes a task 
determines whether it contains a prepotent response. Consider, for example, the 
Day/Night task, which is one of the Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks used to 
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study inhibitory control in childhood. In this task, preschoolers are instructed to say 
“night” to a day picture, and “day” to a night picture (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 
1994; Simpson & Riggs, 2005b). The prepotent responses in this task are the more 
obvious responses of saying “day” to the day picture, and “night” to the night picture. 
In a limited sense, these prepotent responses are stimulus-driven, since it is the 
presentation of day and night stimuli that triggers them. However, outside the 
Day/Night task, the mere presence of these stimuli is not sufficient to make the 
responses of saying “day” and “night” prepotent. This is obvious: despite their weak 
inhibitory control, preschoolers do not struggle to resist saying “night” every time 
they look at the night sky. So there must be something particular about the way that 
children conceptualize the Day/Night task which means the responses “day” and 
“night” become prepotent in this task.  
Once we accept that prepotent responses are the product of the mind, rather than 
the world, it necessarily follows that the way an individual conceptualizes a task will 
influence whether or not it contains a goal-inappropriate prepotent response, and 
therefore whether the task has inhibitory demands. Crucially, it is likely that some 
tasks will contain a goal-inappropriate prepotent response if conceptualized one way, 
and will thus require inhibitory control; but they will contain no such response if 
conceptualized another way, thus avoiding this requirement. We refer to these 
contrasting types of conceptualization as “IC-requiring” and “IC-avoiding”. This 
distinction is important when studying early cognitive development, because 
preschoolers have particularly weak inhibitory control (e.g., Garon, Smith & Bryson, 
2014; Wiebe, Sheffield & Espy, 2012; Willoughby, Wirth & Blair, 2011). Thus, 
whether preschoolers use an IC-requiring or IC-avoiding conceptualization is likely to 
have a dramatic effect on their performance.  
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While it has been suggested that the way a task is conceptualized is likely to 
influence its inhibitory demands (e.g., Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Kloo et al., 2010; 
Russell, 1996; Simpson & Riggs, 2005a), to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
direct evidence to support this suggestion. Accordingly, in this study we sought the 
first empirical evidence for this phenomenon. Studying task conceptualization is 
challenging, because mental representations cannot be observed directly, but must 
instead be inferred from behavior. It is therefore essential that any tasks used are 
reliable and well-understood. The present study therefore used Stimulus-Response 
Compatibility tasks, for two reasons. First, we can be confident that these tasks have 
inhibitory demands. Unlike almost any other developmental measure of inhibitory 
control, there is clear evidence that Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks are 
difficult specifically because of their inhibitory demands (Gerstadt et al., 1994; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2005b, 2009; Simpson, Riggs & Ferrand, 2006). The important 
logical consequence of this, for the experiments reported here, is that if preschoolers 
perform well on any variant of an Stimulus-Response Compatibility task, then the 
inhibitory demands of that task must necessarily be low: preschoolers’ weak 
inhibitory control means they could not succeed if inhibitory demands were high. 
Success on any Stimulus-Response Compatibility task would therefore be consistent 
with preschoolers having conceptualized it in an IC-avoiding way.  
Second, we can be confident about why Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks 
have inhibitory demands. The precise mechanism that creates inhibitory demands in 
these tasks has been extensively studied (Diamond, Kirkham & Amso, 2002; Hanauer 
& Brooks, 2005; Montgomery, Anderson & Uhl, 2008; Montgomery & Koeltzow, 
2010; Simpson & Riggs, 2005a, 2007, 2011; Simpson et al., 2012). When participants 
are told to make two specific responses in these tasks, these two responses become 
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primed (that is, activated to near-threshold levels, such that they can be readily 
produced). Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks’ “if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a” rule 
structure means that the incorrect primed response is triggered on each trial. This 
incorrect response must then be inhibited, so that the goal-appropriate response can be 
made instead. It is this specific aspect of these tasks that creates their inhibitory 
demands. 
To illustrate this with an example: in the Grass/Snow task, children must point 
to one of two picture cards in response to verbal cues. In one version of this task 
(Simpson & Riggs, 2009), participants are shown a picture of a sun and a picture of a 
moon. They are told that when the experimenter says “moon”, they should point to 
the sun card, and when the experimenter says “sun”, they should point to the moon 
card. The two responses – point to sun and point to moon – become primed. The if-A-
then-b/if-B-then-a rules mean that when the “sun” cue is presented, the point to sun 
response is inappropriately triggered; and that when the “moon” cue is presented, the 
point to moon response is inappropriately triggered. These inappropriate responses 
must be inhibited, so that the task rules can be followed correctly. Thus, the inhibitory 
demands of the Grass/Snow task (and other Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks) 
follow on directly from the need to apply these if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules. 
The developmental literature suggests simply that preschoolers find Stimulus-
Response Compatibility tasks difficult because they have weak inhibitory control. 
However, because of task conceptualization this might not be the whole story. The 
main hypothesis of the current study is that these tasks can be passed by preschoolers, 
if they are able to conceptualize the tasks in an IC-avoiding way. This would be 
achieved with any conceptualization that allowed children to make task-appropriate 
responses without having to use if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules. 
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Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 investigated whether preschoolers can pass otherwise challenging 
Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks by conceptualizing them in an IC-avoiding 
way. To do this, we identified two different ways of presenting the task instructions: 
one which emphasized the if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a nature of the task rules, and the 
other which emphasized an alternative way of approaching the task. Importantly, 
while these ways of instructing the task differed, the task stimuli and responses were 
otherwise identical. 
Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks are typically introduced using two rules 
(e.g., “When I say ‘moon’, point to the sun card”, and “When I say ‘sun’, point to the 
moon card”). It may be that this two-rule presentation encourages preschoolers to 
conceptualize the task in a way that uses if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules (i.e., to 
conceptualize the task in an IC-requiring way). In contrast, if the same task were 
presented with a single rule, such as “Point to the other card”, this might encourage 
children to adopt a different conceptualization. If this conceptualization did not entail 
using if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules, then it would not require inhibitory control. 
Children would still need to make the same responses (pointing to “sun” when they 
hear “moon”, and pointing to “moon” when they hear “sun”), but they would be doing 
so in a way that did not rely on their weak inhibitory control, and so they should 
perform better.   
Two points need to be clarified. First, as previously noted, evidence suggests 
that it is specifically the application of if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules that makes 
Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks inhibitory (Diamond, et al., 2002; Hanauer & 
Brooks, 2005; Montgomery, et al., 2008; Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010; Simpson & 
Riggs, 2005a, 2007, 2011; Simpson et al., 2012). Conceptualizing them in any other 
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way will therefore remove their inhibitory demands. Thus, we don’t need to know the 
precise nature of an alternative conceptualization to know that it will be IC-avoiding: 
simply knowing that it does not use if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules is sufficient. Second, 
conceptualizing a Stimulus-Response Compatibility task with a single rule rather than 
with two rules will probably reduce its working memory demands, although not 
sufficiently to make the task significantly easier. Diamond and colleagues (2002) 
tested this possibility using the Day/night task, and found this Stimulus-Response 
Compatibility task to be no easier when introduced with a single rule.  
Experiment 1 used two Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks, each of which 
was presented in two ways (a one-rule presentation and a two-rule presentation). We 
used a version of the Grass/Snow task, referred to here as the “Verbal-cue task”, and a 
new Stimulus-Response Compatibility task which we called the “Box task”. These 
tasks were chosen to provide baselines for both poor performance and good 
performance: performance on the Verbal-cue task is known to be poor when 
presented with two rules (Simpson & Riggs, 2009), and performance on the Box task 
is known to be good when presented with a single rule (Carroll, Apperly & Riggs, 
2007a&b; Simpson, Riggs & Simon, 2004).  
Experiment 1 compared preschoolers’ performance on two versions of the Box 
task and two versions of the Verbal-cue task (see Table 1). In the 2-Rule versions of 
these tasks, the instructions encouraged children to use an IC-requiring if-A-then-b/ 
if-B-then-a conceptualization. In contrast, the 1-Rule versions encouraged an IC-
avoiding conceptualization, which did not use if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules. The most 
parsimonious prediction was that the 1-Rule versions of the tasks would be 
conceptualized in an IC-avoiding way (so performance would be good), and the 2-
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Rule versions would be conceptualized in an IC-requiring way (so performance would 
be poor). 
Table 1. Instructions for the four tasks used in Experiment 1. 
 Number of rules in the presentation of the task 
Task 1-Rule 2-Rule 
Verbal-cue  When I name one card, point at the 
other card. So when I say ‘sun’ point 
to the other card, and when I say 
‘moon’ point to the other card. 
When I say ‘sun’ point to the 
moon card, and when I say 
‘moon’ point to the sun card. 
Box  When I put the sticker in one box, 
point at the other box. So when I put 
the sticker in the small box point at the 
other box, and when I put the sticker 
in the big box point at the other box. 
When I put the sticker in the 
small box point at the big box, 
and when I put the sticker in 
the big box point to the small 
box. 
 
In the Box task, participants were presented with two boxes – one large, one 
small – with windows in the side. On each trial the experimenter placed a marker (i.e., 
a sticker) in one box. In the 1-Rule Box task, preschoolers were told “When I put the 
sticker in one box, point at the other box”. We predicted that preschoolers would 
conceptualize this task in a way that avoided the need to apply if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a 
rules, and performance on this task would be good. In the 2-Rule Box task, 
preschoolers were presented with a pair of rules: “When I put the sticker in the big 
box, point at the small box. When I put the sticker in the small box, point at the big 
box”. Thus, the task was explained using if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules. We predicted 
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that preschoolers would conceptualize the task in a way that used these rules, that the 
task would thus have high inhibitory demands, and that performance would be poor. 
In the 1-Rule Verbal-cue task preschoolers were told, “When I name one card, 
point at the other card”. We predicted that preschoolers would conceptualize the task 
in an IC-avoiding way (i.e. they would avoid using if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules), and 
that performance would therefore be good. In contrast, in the 2-Rule Verbal-cue task 
(the standard version of this task) preschoolers were told, “When I say ‘sun’, point at 
the moon card; when I say ‘moon’, point at the sun card”. We predicted that 
preschoolers would conceptualize the task in an IC-requiring way (i.e., using if-A-
then-b/if-B-then-a rules), and that therefore performance would be poor. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four children participated (12 boys, 12 girls). Children were 
aged from 3 years, 0 months to 4 years, 2 months (mean = 3 years, 7 months). The 
children attended a preschool in the town of Colchester, England. All spoke English as 
their first language, and none had any behavioral or educational problems. The group 
was predominantly white, and was of mixed social class. 
Design. A repeated-measures design was used, with Number of Rules (1 Rule vs. 2 
Rules) and Task (Box vs. Verbal-cue) as independent variables. The dependent 
variable was accuracy (number of correct responses from 16 test trials in each task). 
Materials. For the Verbal-cue task, two laminated cards (one showing a sun, one 
showing a moon) were used, measuring 14cm by 10cm. For the Box task, two 
cardboard boxes, one small (7cm x 7cm x 7cm) and one large (15cm x 15cm x 15cm) 
were used. The boxes had windows cut into the side. A sticker was used as a marker to 
prompt the child. 
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Procedure. Each child completed all four tasks, across two sessions not more than 
one week apart. Order of presentation was counterbalanced both between sessions 
(the 1-Rule tasks were presented in one session, and the 2-Rule tasks in the other) and 
within sessions (Verbal-cue task and Box task). Children were tested individually in a 
quiet area within their nursery. For each task, children were shown the cards or boxes 
and told the rules. They then received four training trials with feedback, followed by 
16 test trials without feedback. (Procedure was based on the Grass/Snow task used by 
Simpson & Riggs, 2009.) 
In the 2-Rule Verbal-cue task, the experimenter and child sat opposite each 
other, with a sun card and a moon card placed side-by-side between them. The 
experimenter asked the child to point to the sun card and moon card in turn. The 
experimenter then explained “When I say ‘sun’ [pointing to the sun card with her 
right hand] point to the moon card [pointing to the moon card with her left hand]. And 
when I say ‘moon’ [pointing to the moon card with her left hand] point to the sun card 
[pointing to the sun card with her right hand]”. The child was asked to do this, and 
was corrected if an error was made. Children then completed four training trials (in the 
order ABAB), and received feedback for both correct and incorrect responses. 
Children were then given 16 test trials in a fixed pseudorandom order 
(ABBABAABBABAABAB). During test trials, no feedback was given. If children 
made more than one response, the first response was recorded. 
The other three tasks were presented in a similar way, with specific instructions 
as follows: In the 1-Rule Verbal-cue task, the experimenter said, “When I name one 
card, point at the other card. So when I say ‘sun’ [putting her right hand on the sun 
card] point to the other card [pointing to the moon card with her left hand]. And when 
I say ‘moon’ [putting her right hand on the moon card] point to the other card 
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[pointing to the sun card with her left hand]”. In the 2-Rule Box task, the experimenter 
said, “When I put the sticker in the small box [putting the sticker in the small box with 
her right hand] point at the big box [pointing to the big box with her left hand]. And 
when I put the sticker in the big box [putting the sticker in the box with her right hand] 
point to the small box [pointing to the small box with her left hand]”. In the 1-Rule 
Box task, the experimenter said “When I put the sticker in one box, point at the other 
box. So when I put the sticker in the small box [putting the sticker in the small box 
with her right hand] point at the other box [pointing to the big box with her left hand], 
and when I put the sticker in the big box [putting the sticker in the big box with her 
right hand] point at the other box [pointing to the small box with her left hand]”.  
Results  
Accuracy on the four tasks is shown in Figure 1. Performance was poor on the 
two Verbal-cue tasks (below 50%), but good on the two Box tasks (above 90%). There 
were no significant effects involving order of presentation or gender. Data were 
analysed in a repeated-measures ANOVA with Number of Rules (1 Rule vs. 2 Rules) 
and Task (Verbal-cue vs. Box) as factors. There was a significant effect of Task, 
F(1,23)=38.4, p<.001, partial eta squared=.626, but no effect of Number of Rules, and 
no interaction. The pattern of results was surprising, but clear: whether the task was 
explained with one rule or with two rules did not affect children’s performance. 
However, both of the Box tasks were easier than both of the Verbal-cue tasks. 
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Figure 1. Accuracy on the two Verbal-cue tasks and two Box tasks in Experiment 1. 
Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
Discussion 
The prediction that Stimulus-Response Compatibility performance would be 
good when tasks were introduced with one rule, and poor when tasks were introduced 
with two rules, was not supported by the data. Instead, both versions of the Box task 
were easy, and both versions of the Verbal-cue task were difficult, regardless of how 
the tasks were presented. These results showed that our hypothesis for Experiment 1 
was wrong: the “one-rule” manipulation did not induce an IC-avoiding task 
conceptualization in either task. Furthermore, the results showed an unexpected 
difference in performance between the Box task and the Verbal-cue task. This 
difference required explanation, since it was apparent that these preschoolers had 
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weak inhibitory control (as shown by their poor performance on the Verbal-cue task), 
and yet they performed very well on the two Box tasks.  
We suggest that the way preschoolers conceptualize Stimulus-Response 
Compatibility tasks may yet be crucial – albeit not in the way we predicted. The 
observation that the Box task was easy strongly suggests that preschoolers did 
somehow conceptualize it in an IC-avoiding way. This must be so, because Stimulus-
Response Compatibility tasks are difficult when their inhibitory demands are high 
(Gerstadt et al., 1994; Simpson & Riggs, 2005b, 2009; Simpson et al., 2006). The 
question is how do preschoolers conceptualize the Box task in an IC-avoiding way, 
whilst they conceptualized the Verbal-cue task in an IC-requiring way?  
We speculate that the difference might arise from the way the experimenter 
cued responding: the spatial cue of placing a marker in one of the two boxes in the 
Box task, versus the verbal cue of naming one of the two cards in the Verbal-cue task. 
Our suggested explanation is as follows: in the Box task, when the experimenter 
places the marker in a box, preschoolers can see that one box is “marked” (i.e., it 
contains the sticker) and the other is “unmarked” (it is empty). This means that 
preschoolers could, in theory, produce the correct response simply by finding the 
unmarked box on each trial and pointing at it. That is, they could conceptualize the 
task as “select-the-unmarked-location” (or similar). Doing this would allow them to 
completely ignore the marked box – and so there would be no need to apply the IC-
requiring if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules. We cannot be sure, of course, that this is what 
children were doing on the task in Experiment 1. We simply note that the use of a 
marker made it possible for the Box task to be conceptualized in this IC-avoiding 
way. 
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In the Verbal-cue task, in contrast, this select-the-unmarked-location 
conceptualization could not be applied, because the experimenter did not physically 
mark either of the cards. Instead, children’s responding was cued verbally. The only 
way to succeed on the Verbal-cue task was to attend to this verbal cue: first, to 
determine whether the experimenter had said “sun” or “moon”; and then to use the 
IC-requiring if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules to point at the card not named by the 
experimenter. Children must do this irrespective of whether the experimenter 
introduced the Verbal-cue task using one rule or two rules. Unlike the Box task, 
therefore, we note that the absence of a “marker” on the Verbal-cue task means that it 
is not possible for children to adopt the same kind of IC-avoiding conceptualization. 
This hypothesis could explain why the Box task was easier than the Verbal-cue task 
in Experiment 1: because preschoolers can conceptualize the Box task in a way that 
lets them avoid its inhibitory demands, but they cannot do this on the Verbal-cue task. 
Experiment 2 sought to test this hypothesis directly. 
Experiment 2 
While the surprising results of Experiment 1 indicated that our specific 
hypothesis for that experiment was wrong, it nevertheless suggested that the overall 
hypothesis of this article – that preschoolers could succeed on an Stimulus-Response 
Compatibility task, if they were able to conceptualize it an IC-avoiding way – might 
yet prove correct. We speculate that children were able to use just such an IC-
avoiding conceptualization on the Box task, possibly by conceptualizing the task as a 
search for the unmarked location, rather than as one where they must follow IC-
requiring if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules. In order to directly test this hypothesis, we 
required two new and closely matched Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks on 
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which this marked/unmarked difference could be compared. We devised two such 
tasks for Experiment 2: the 2-Card task and the 4-Card task. 
The 2-Card and 4-Card tasks used picture cards (like the Verbal-cue task) and 
marker-cued responding (like the Box task). In the 2-Card task, the experimenter and 
child shared a single pair of cards for prompting and responding. In the 4-Card task, 
the experimenter and child each used their own pair of cards. The 2-Card task made it 
possible for children to adopt an IC-avoiding conceptualization (such as select-the-
unmarked-location), since the correct response in this task would always involve 
pointing to the unmarked location. In contrast, on the 4-Card task it was not possible 
to adopt this IC-avoiding conceptualization, since neither of the cards the child would 
respond to were marked.  
In the 2-Card task, the experimenter cued one of the two cards by placing a star-
shaped marker on it. Children were told, “When I put the star on the sun, point at the 
moon. When I put the star on the moon, point at the sun”. Our hypothesis was that 
performance on the 2-Card task would be good, as it was possible to conceptualize 
this task in an IC-avoiding way. If children adopted a select-the-unmarked-location 
conceptualization, they could succeed by simply pointing to whichever of the two 
cards was not marked (thus avoiding any need to apply if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules).  
In the 4-Card task, the experimenter used one pair of cards for prompting (one 
sun, one moon), while children responded on a separate pair of cards (one sun, one 
moon). The important feature of this task was that children could not respond simply 
by selecting the unmarked card: they pointed at a different pair of cards to the 
experimenter, and so both their cards were always unmarked. This meant it was not 
possible to conceptualize this task using the IC-avoiding select-the-unmarked-location 
conceptualization. Our hypothesis was that in the 4-Card task, children would have to 
 17
use the IC-requiring if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a conceptualization, and that performance 
would therefore be poor. 
In Experiment 2, performance on the 2-Card task and the 4-Card task was 
directly compared. In addition, to provide baselines for good and poor performance, 
the 1-Rule Box task and 2-Rule Verbal-cue task (from Experiment 1) were included. 
We made two predictions: first, that performance on the 2-Card task and 1-Rule Box 
task would be good, as both could be conceptualized in an IC-avoiding way (such as 
select-the-unmarked-location). Second, we predicted that performance on the 4-Card 
task and 2-Rule Verbal-cue task would be poor, as neither could be conceptualized in 
an IC-avoiding way.  This experiment also tested an alternative hypothesis for the 
data obtained in Experiment 1: that Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks are harder 
when responding is cued verbally, as in the Verbal-cue task, than physically, as in the 
Box task. We predicted that performance on the 4-Card task would be poor, despite it 
being physically cued, which would be incompatible with this alternative hypothesis.   
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four children participated (13 boys, 11 girls). Children were 
aged from 3 years, 0 months to 4 years, 2 months (mean = 3 years, 6 months), and 
attended a preschool in the town of Colchester, England. All spoke English as their 
first language, and none had any behavioral or educational problems. The group was 
predominantly white and of mixed social class. None of the children had participated 
in the previous experiment. 
Design. A repeated-measures design was used, with Task (2-Card, 4-Card, 1-Rule 
Box, 2-Rule Verbal-cue) as the independent variable. The dependent variable was 
accuracy (number of correct responses from 16 trials in each task). 
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Materials. Four picture cards were used (two showing sun pictures, and two showing 
moon pictures). Each card measured 14cm by 10cm. A gold star was used as a marker. 
Procedure. Children were tested on all four tasks, over two sessions not more than 
one week apart. Order of presentation was counterbalanced (the four tasks were 
presented in each of the 24 possible orders). For each task, children received four 
training trials (with feedback), followed by 16 test trials (without feedback). 
In the 2-Card task, a single pair of cards (a sun card and a moon card) was 
placed face-up between the child and the experimenter. On each trial, the experimenter 
placed a star on one of the two cards (in the top right corner). Children were told that 
when the experimenter put the marker on the sun, they should point to the moon; and 
when she put the marker on the moon, they should point to the sun. In the 4-Card task, 
there were two pairs of cards (each comprising one sun card and one moon card). On 
each trial the experimenter gave cues using one pair of cards, and children made their 
responses using the other pair of cards. The experimenter’s cards were attached to a 
magnetic board, and were arranged vertically. The experimenter explained that the 
pictures on the board were her pictures, and that the two on the table belonged to the 
child. The experimenter placed the marker on one of the pictures on the board, and the 
child responded by pointing to the pictures on the table. The 1-Rule Box task and 2-
Rule Verbal-cue task matched those in Experiment 1. 
Results  
Accuracy on the four tasks is shown in Figure 2. Performance was poor on the 4-
Card task and the 2-Rule Verbal-cue task (below 50%). In contrast, performance was 
good on the 2-Card task and the 1-Rule Box task (above 90%). There were no 
significant effects involving order of presentation or gender. Data were analysed in a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with Task (2-Card, 4-Card, 1-Rule Box, 2-Rule Verbal-
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cue) as the factor. There was a significant effect of Task, F(3,69)=49.7, p<.001, partial 
eta squared =.684. Planned comparisons revealed that performance on the 2-Card task 
was significantly better than on the 4-Card task, t(23)=10.7, p<.001, 95% CI 49.1 to 
72.8%. Performance on the 2-Card task did not differ significantly from the 1-Rule 
Box task, and performance on the 4-Card task did not differ from the 2-Rule Verbal-
cue task. 
 
 
Figure 2. Accuracy on the four tasks in Experiment 2. Error bars show the standard 
error of the mean. 
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Discussion 
In line with predictions, performance on the 2-Card task was much better than 
on the 4-Card task. This was consistent with the hypothesis that the 2-Card task is 
easy because it is possible to conceptualize it in an IC-avoiding way. Results were 
also consistent with the hypothesis that the 4-Card task is difficult because it cannot 
be conceptualized in this way, as both response locations remain unmarked. The task 
must therefore instead be conceptualized in an IC-requiring way, following if-A-then-
b/if-B-then-a rules. Thus, these data are consistent with our overall hypothesis that it 
is possible for preschoolers to perform well on an Stimulus-Response Compatibility 
task if they conceptualize it in an IC-avoiding way. The poor performance on the 4-
Card task also speaks against the possibility that Stimulus-Response Compatibility 
tasks are easier when responding is cued physically rather than verbally (as in the 
Verbal-cue task).   
These data support the proposal that conceptualization can directly affect 
inhibitory demands on a task. However, there were other differences between the 2- 
and 4-Card tasks that might have affected performance. The stimuli used in the 4-
Card task were necessarily more complex than those used in the 2-Card task: there 
were two pairs of cards rather than one pair, and the orientation of the two pairs of 
cards differed. There was no specific reason to think that these differences affected 
performance. Nevertheless, as task conceptualization cannot be directly observed, 
evidence for it would be more compelling if its effects were seen in the absence of 
any such differences. In Experiment 3, therefore, we sought to test whether, in the 
absence of other differences, the way an Stimulus-Response Compatibility task is 
conceptualized is sufficient on its own to drive differences in task performance. 
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Experiment 3 
Testing whether conceptualization alone can determine children’s performance 
on an Stimulus-Response Compatibility task requires a task that can be 
conceptualized in different ways. To that end, we adapted the 4-Card task used in 
Experiment 2. This task is difficult for preschoolers, and we can be confident that it 
has high inhibitory demands. It also uses two cue cards and two response cards, 
meaning that it offers scope for varying instructions and conceptualization. For 
Experiment 3, we compared the 4-Card task – henceforward referred to as the 
Standard Card task – with two new versions: the 1-Rule Card task and the 2-Rule 
Card task. These two tasks were identical apart from the way that their instructions 
were presented, with the 2-Rule presentation intended to induce a conceptualization 
using if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules, and the 1-Rule presentation intended to induce an 
IC-avoiding conceptualization (outlined below). The logic was therefore the same as 
Experiment 1, in that the aim was to induce two different conceptualizations of the 
same task. 
An important feature of the 1-Rule and 2-Rule Card tasks was that the 
experimenter’s cards and the child’s cards were placed next to each other, as shown in 
Figure 3. This meant the experimenter’s sun card was adjacent to the child’s moon 
card, and her moon card was adjacent to the child’s sun card. In consequence, when 
children responded correctly, they would also be mirroring the experimenter’s 
actions. For example, when the experimenter pointed to her sun card (on her left), to 
make a correct response the child would point to their moon card (also on the 
experimenter's left), thus mirroring the experimenter’s action. If children 
conceptualized the Card task using if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules, then it would be IC-
requiring and difficult. However, if children conceptualized the task as “point the 
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same way as the experimenter” (or similar), this would allow them to avoid the task’s 
inhibitory demands, and perform well.  
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the card arrangements and instructions given in 
the 4-Card tasks used in Experiment 3. 
 
This card arrangement meant that it was possible for children to adopt either an 
IC-requiring conceptualization or an IC-avoiding conceptualization, and allowed us to 
test whether differences in conceptualization alone can lead to differences in task 
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instructions. In the 2-Rule Card task, the standard Stimulus-Response Compatibility 
instructions were used (“When I point to the ‘sun’, you point to the ‘moon’; and when 
I point to the ‘moon’, you point to the ‘sun’”). These rules direct children to respond 
on the basis of IC-requiring if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules, and so performance would 
be expected to be poor. In the 1-Rule Card task, children were told to respond by 
following a single rule (“Point the same way as me”). This directs children to 
conceptualize the task as one where they simply point the same way as the 
experimenter. The cards were not named when introducing the task, making it 
unlikely that children would be aware that if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules could be 
applied. Thus, children would use an IC-avoiding conceptualization, and so 
performance was predicted to be good. In both tasks, the cards were arranged in the 
same way and children needed to make the same responses to the same cues. The only 
difference was how the instructions led them to conceptualize the task. 
As well as directly testing the effects of conceptualization on a single task, 
Experiment 3 allowed a further comparison. By comparing performance in the 
Standard Card task (known from Experiment 2 to be difficult) with performance on 
the 2-Rule Card task, we could test whether children adopted an IC-avoiding 
conceptualization, even when the task instructions did not specifically direct them to 
do so. The Standard and 2-Rule tasks used the same instructions; what distinguished 
them was that it was possible to adopt an IC-avoiding mirror-the-experimenter 
conceptualization in the 2-Rule Card task, but not possible to use this 
conceptualization in the Standard Card task (because of the centrally arranged cue 
cards). If some children in the 2-Rule Card task spontaneously adopted an IC-
avoiding conceptualization, then performance on this task should be somewhat better 
than the Standard Card task. A between-participants design was used to rule out the 
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possibility that children might transfer their knowledge of an IC-avoiding mirror-the-
experimenter conceptualization from the 1-Rule Card task to the 2-Rule Card task. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty children participated (31 boys, 29 girls). Children were aged from 
3 years, 0 months to 4 years, 2 months (mean = 3 years, 7 months), and all attended a 
preschool in the town of Colchester, England. All spoke English as their first 
language, and none had any behavioral or educational problems. The group was 
predominantly white, and of mixed social class. No children had participated in either 
previous experiment. 
Design. A between-participant design was used (to avoid any transfer of task 
conceptualizations between tasks), with Task (Standard Card task, 2-Rule Card task 
and 1-Rule Card task) as the independent variable. The dependent variable was 
accuracy (number of correct responses from 16 trials in each task). 
Materials. Four picture cards were used (two “sun” pictures, and two “moon” 
pictures). Each card measured 14cm by 10cm. 
Procedure. Children were randomly assigned to one of the three tasks. For each task, 
children were introduced to the rules and then received four training trials (with 
feedback), followed by 16 test trials (without feedback). The experimenter gave cues 
using one pair of cards, and children responded using the other pair of cards. The 
experimenter’s cards were placed on a red sheet of paper to distinguish them from the 
child’s cards. The experimenter explained that the pictures on the red paper were hers, 
and that the two in front of the child belonged to the child. 
The Standard Card task was identical to the 4-Card Stimulus-Response 
Compatibility task reported in Experiment 2. The 2-Rule Card task and 1-Rule Card 
task differed from the Standard Card task in that the experimenter’s cards were 
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arranged left-to-right, rather than centrally (see Figure 3). These two tasks differed 
from each other only in how they were explained. In the 2-rule Card task, the 
experimenter said, “When I point to the sun [pointing to the sun card with her right 
hand], you point at the moon [pointing to the moon card her left hand]. And when I 
point to the moon [pointing to the moon card with her right hand], you point at the 
sun [pointing to the sun card her left hand]”. In the 1-rule Card task, the experimenter 
said, “You point the same way as me. When I point to this card [pointing to the sun 
card with her right hand], you point the same way [pointing to the moon card her left 
hand]. And when I point to this card [pointing to the moon card with her right hand], 
you point the same way [pointing to the sun card her left hand]”. 
Results  
Accuracy on the three tasks is shown in Figure 4. Accuracy was highest on the 
1-Rule Card task (87%). Accuracy was lower on the 2-rule Card task (69%), and 
lowest on the Standard Card task (51%). Data were analysed in a between-participants 
ANOVA with Task (Standard Card task, 2-Rule Card task and 1-Rule Card task) as 
the factor. There was a significant effect of Task, F(2,53)=13.02, p<.001, partial eta 
squared =.314. Planned comparisons revealed that performance on the 1-Rule Card 
task was better than the 2-Rule Card task, t(38)=2.75, p=.009, 95% CI 4.7% to 30.9%. 
In turn, performance on the 2-Rule Card task was better than the Standard Card task, 
t(38)=2.30, p=.027, 95% CI 2.14% to 33.5%. 
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Figure 4. Accuracy on the three versions of the Card task used in Experiment 3. Error 
bars show the standard error of the mean. 
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on the 1-Rule Card task, in which the task was explained with instructions that 
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the exact same cues. On one task, doing so was challenging, while on the other, it was 
easy. These data offer strong support for the proposal that children with weak 
inhibitory control can overcome difficulties on an Stimulus-Response Compatibility 
task by conceptualizing that task in an IC-avoiding way. 
Performance on the 2-Rule Card task was better than the Standard Card task, in 
which the orientation of the experimenter’s cards meant that it was not possible for 
children to adopt an IC-avoiding conceptualization. This suggests that in the 2-Rule 
Card task, at least some children adopted the IC-avoiding mirror-the-experimenter 
conceptualization, even when the task instructions did direct them to. However, 
significantly fewer children used this IC-avoiding conceptualization in the 2-Rule 
Card task than in the 1-Rule Card task.  
Overall, there were three levels of performance in Experiment 3. Preschoolers’ 
accuracy on the 1-Rule Card task was better than the 2-Rule Card task, which in turn 
was better than on the Standard Card task. We suggest that these different levels of 
performance are best explained by different proportions of children adopting an IC-
avoiding conceptualization in each task. Performance was best when most children 
conceptualized the task using the IC-avoiding conceptualization, when it was 
suggested by the task instructions in the 1-Rule Card task. Performance was 
intermediate when some children spontaneously adopted the IC-avoiding 
conceptualization, even though it was not suggested to them in the 2-Rule Card task. 
Finally, performance was poorest when no children used the IC-avoiding 
conceptualization in the Standard Card task, because the orientation of the cards 
prevented its use. 
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General Discussion 
Task conceptualization is the process by which the instructions provided by an 
experimenter are turned into a mental representation of that task in the participant’s 
mind. Together, the three experiments in the present article show this 
conceptualization process at work. They provide the first direct evidence that the way 
children conceptualize a task influences whether that task has inhibitory demands. In 
doing so, they highlight an important and neglected aspect of cognitive development, 
by which problems are overcome not through an increase in a particular cognitive 
capacity, but by changing the way that a problem is conceived. These findings also 
inform our understanding of the relationship between conceptual knowledge and 
inhibitory demands. 
Using IC-avoiding conceptualizations of Stimulus-Response Compatibility and other 
inhibitory tasks 
The present study tested the hypothesis that preschoolers could succeed on an 
Stimulus-Response Compatibility task if they conceptualize it an IC-avoiding way. 
These data provide direct evidence that preschoolers can use task conceptualization to 
eliminate a task’s inhibitory demands. They also provide the first insight into the 
question of when an IC-avoiding conceptualization is adopted. Our data suggest that 
all children were able to spontaneously adopt the IC-avoiding select-the-unmarked-
location conceptualization on the Box task, even when it was not suggested to them 
by the instructions (the 2-Rule Box task in Experiment 1). In contrast, with the Card 
task, only some children adopted the IC-avoiding mirror-the-experimenter 
conceptualization, when it was not explained to them (the 2-Rule Card task in 
Experiment 3). These findings raise two questions: why did more children 
spontaneously adopt the IC-avoiding conceptualization of the Box task than did with 
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the Card task? And what distinguishes children who adopted an IC-avoiding 
conceptualization from those who did not? 
On the first question, one possibility is that preschoolers just found the IC-
avoiding select-the-unmarked-location conceptualization of the Box task easier than 
the IC-avoiding mirror-the-experimenter conceptualization of the Card task. This is 
possible, though unlikely. We suggest that preschoolers are comfortably able to use 
both these IC-avoiding conceptualizations. Selecting the unmarked location requires 
understanding the concept of absence (i.e., the absence of a marker from a location), 
which is associated with understanding negation. Language research (Bloom, 1970, 
1993; Nordmeyer & Frank, 2014; Pea, 1980) shows that children can demonstrate an 
understanding of negation from infancy. This strongly suggests that children have the 
cognitive abilities needed to select an unmarked location, and should therefore be well 
able to adopt the IC-avoiding conceptualization of the Box task. Children seem just as 
equipped to generate the IC-avoiding conceptualization of the Card task. This requires 
them to mirror the experimenter’s actions. Children engage in imitation from a very 
young age (e.g., Meltzoff, 1995; Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers & Bekkering, 2011), and so 
clearly have the cognitive ability needed to adopt the IC-avoiding conceptualization 
of the Card task. 
It seems more likely that what distinguishes the Box task from the Card task is 
how likely children are to encode the information needed to use the IC-avoiding 
conceptualization – specifically when the task is introduced using the standard two-
rule instructions. Describing the task with these instructions encourages children to 
attend to the boxes or cards used in the task, since using the if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a 
rules requires children to identify which is being cued in order to work out how to 
respond (e.g., “The experimenter selected ‘sun’, so I need to point to ‘moon’”). In the 
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Box task, attending to the boxes makes the IC-avoiding conceptualization easy to 
spot. During the training trials, children observe that just one of these boxes is 
unmarked, and that this is the one they should select. In the Card task, which uses four 
separate cards, there are twice as many locations available to encode. In addition, 
attending to these locations is likely to distract from adopting the IC-avoiding mirror-
the-experimenter conceptualization. Mirroring the experimenter requires children to 
attend to the direction in which the experimenter is pointing, rather than the identity of 
the location selected. Thus, attending to which card has been selected in the Card task 
may make it harder to spot that an easy IC-avoiding conceptualization is available. 
Concentrating on following the if-A-then-b/if-B-then-a rules, children may fail to 
notice that they are mirroring the experimenter. 
Second, what distinguishes preschoolers who spontaneously adopt an IC-
avoiding conceptualization from those who use the IC-requiring conceptualization? 
One possibility is that children are distinguished by their metacognitive awareness: 
that is, their awareness of what makes the Card task difficult, and what strategies they 
can use to make it easier. It could be that children who spontaneously adopt the IC-
avoiding conceptualization of the 2-Rule Card task had better metacognitive 
awareness, and so realized that this conceptualization makes the task easier. At 
present we have no data about the role of metacognitive awareness in children’s 
spontaneous adoption of IC-avoiding conceptualizations when performing Stimulus-
Response Compatibility or other tasks. Future research should investigate this 
possibility. 
This article investigated the role of task conceptualization in creating the 
inhibitory demands of Stimulus-Response Compatibility tasks. What about other tasks 
used to study inhibitory control? Our hypothesis is that in order for a task’s inhibitory 
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demands to be high, participants must not be adopting an IC-avoiding 
conceptualization when performing it (either because one is not available, or because 
participants are not ‘spotting it’). With adults, we suspect that IC-avoiding 
conceptualizations are often not available on inhibitory tasks, because of the way the 
tasks are structured. Specifically, in order to determine the correct response on many 
adult inhibitory tasks, participants must attend to a stimulus which then triggers an 
inappropriate response. For example, in the colour conflict Stroop task, in order to 
determine the appropriate response (the ink color of that word), participants have to 
attend to the stimulus that triggers the inappropriate response (the word presented on 
each trial). With young children, in contrast, it seems more likely that IC-avoiding 
conceptualizations are possible, but they fail to spot them. Again, this is a topic for 
future research. 
How do inhibitory control and task conceptualization interact? 
The present study also informs our understanding of the relationship between 
inhibitory control and conceptual knowledge. We believe that task conceptualization 
is likely to be directly influenced by conceptual knowledge. What children know, and 
when they know it, will determine which conceptualizations of a task will be 
available to them during development. This idea leads on, in turn, to consideration of 
how conceptual knowledge may determine executive demands across a range of 
domains. The present article investigated the application of an IC-avoiding 
conceptualization to a single task, as a means of illustrating a more general principle: 
that the ability to use IC-avoiding conceptualizations depends on children’s 
understanding of the specific domain being tested. If children’s understanding of the 
domain is good, then that understanding may make IC-avoiding conceptualizations 
more likely.  
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The process of task conceptualization emphasizes the extent to which inhibitory 
control and conceptual knowledge interact during early cognitive development. 
Traditionally, weak inhibitory control has been viewed as a block to the expression of 
good conceptual understanding. For example, it has been suggested that young 
children have good conceptual understanding in domains as diverse as theory of mind 
(Scott & Baillargeon, 2009), the physical world (Baker et al., 2011), counterfactual 
thinking (Beck et al., 2011), and strategic reasoning (Apperly & Carroll, 2009) – but 
that sometimes their knowledge cannot be expressed because of their weak IC. In 
other words, preschoolers “know” the right answer, but fail to inhibit the wrong 
answer. The proposal of the present article – that task conceptualization influences 
inhibitory demands – suggests that inhibitory control and conceptual knowledge can 
interact in another way. Poor conceptual knowledge can expose preschoolers’ weak 
inhibitory control, because they only need to apply inhibitory control if poor 
understanding leads to an IC-requiring conceptualization. A better understanding 
could have produced an IC-avoiding conceptualization – one that rendered their weak 
inhibitory control irrelevant. 
To illustrate this point with an example, consider tasks that test two kinds of 
reasoning: counterfactual reasoning and future hypothetical reasoning (Perner, Sprung 
& Steinkogler, 2004; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998; Robinson & Beck, 
2000). In a counterfactual reasoning task, preschoolers are asked how the current 
location of an object would be different if the past had been different (e.g., “What if 
the car had gone the other way – which garage would it be in?”). Preschoolers find 
this task difficult, and evidence suggests it requires inhibitory control (Beck, Riggs & 
Gorniak, 2009; Drayton, Turley-Ames & Guajardo, 2011). Preschoolers seem to have 
difficulty resisting pointing to the current location of the object in the counterfactual 
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task. In comparison, in a future hypothetical reasoning task, preschoolers are asked 
how the future location of an object could be different from its current location (e.g., 
“What if next time the car goes the other way – which garage would it be in?”). This 
task is easy for preschoolers, despite their poor inhibitory control. From this, we can 
conclude that inhibitory demands on the future hypothetical task are low or absent.  
Why can preschoolers resist pointing to the current location of the object in the 
future hypothetical task, but not in the counterfactual reasoning task? The questions in 
the two tasks are similar, yet children’s performance is strikingly different. Informed 
by the findings from the present study, we suggest that the answer may lie partly in 
the way that preschoolers conceptualize the tasks. In the counterfactual reasoning 
task, preschoolers think that the current location of the object is relevant to a question 
about its current location (albeit a hypothetical question). This means that 
counterfactual reasoning tasks require inhibitory control to prevent a response to that 
location, and so preschoolers perform poorly. In contrast, in the future hypothetical 
task, preschoolers think that the current location of the object is not relevant to a 
question about its future location. This allows them to adopt an IC-avoiding 
conceptualization of the task, meaning that they perform well on future hypothetical 
tasks. 
Our suggestion is that the future hypothetical task does not require inhibitory 
control because preschoolers have a sound conceptual understanding of the 
relationship between the present and the future. They know that the future is different 
from the present. In contrast, their understanding of counterfactuality is poor: they are 
not fully conversant with the notion that counterfactual facts supersede current reality. 
Preschoolers therefore regard the current location of the object as potentially relevant 
in a counterfactual reasoning task, and so must rely on their weak inhibitory control to 
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suppress any reference to it. We argue that it is the combination of an inadequate task 
conceptualization and weak inhibitory control that causes poor performance on 
counterfactual reasoning tasks. There must therefore be multiple routes to 
developmental success on counterfactual tasks: children could perform better either 
through increases in inhibitory control, or through improved conceptual 
understanding. Such a view would also suggest that when adults succeed on measures 
of counterfactual thinking, it may not be because they are better at inhibiting the 
wrong response. Rather, their increased conceptual understanding may mean that the 
wrong response is unlikely to arise in the first place. 
Conclusion 
The present article is the first to directly study how task conceptualization 
influences inhibitory demands. This process was investigated in preschoolers, whose 
weak inhibitory control means that whether they conceptualize a task in an IC-
requiring way or an IC-avoiding way has a dramatic effect on performance. Having 
demonstrated that this process exists, it remains for future research to establish in 
what other situations conceptualization is used by young children to reduce inhibitory 
demands (with future hypothetical reasoning being a likely candidate domain); as well 
as to identify and understand the factors that determine its use across development 
more generally. 
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